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We extend a model of wasteful state aid in Dewatripont and Seabright (2006, 
Journal of the European Economic Association 4, 513--522) by a supranational 
controlling authority. The model combines moral hazard and adverse selection to 
show that politicians fund wasteful projects to signal their effort. Voters, unable to 
observe project benefits or effort, reward funding with a reelection premium that 
separates a high-effort politician from a low-effort politician. We examine state aid 
control by a benevolent authority which receives extra signals about the state of the 
world. We find that signals on the politician type are worthless. For signals on the 
project type, we derive a sufficient condition for aid control to unambiguously 
decrease welfare. We also prove that politicians do not respond to marginal changes 
in incentives. In this setup, the optimal state aid control is fairly often no control.  
 
Keywords: state aid, signaling, career concerns, aid control  
 
JEL: D72, D78, D82, H25 
 
Acknowledgements 
We would like to thank two anonymous referees, seminar audience at Charles 
University in Prague, and participants of the 2008 Czech Economic Society Annual 
Conference in Prague. This research has been financially supported by the Czech 
Ministry of Education (MSM 0021620841) and the Czech National Science Council 
(GACR 402/09/1066). 1 Introduction
In this paper, we investigate the possibility and desirability of supranational
control of state aid in a framework where wasteful state aid serves as a signal
of eﬀort by national politicians. Based on the assumption that state aid can be
both proﬁtable or wasteful, we examine why a supranational controller should
not be willing to ban state aid projects funded by the national authorities. We
assume a benevolent controller, hence the topic can be treated as an optimal
ex post control problem. Our main result that in this setup, the case for the
welfare-improving state aid control is rather narrow.
The costs and beneﬁts of state aid are topics of joint interest of international
economics, industrial organization, and political economy. In strategic trade
theory, competition of countries through state aid is seen as detrimental to
welfare (Spencer, Brander 1983; Krugman 1984; Dixit 1984; Eaton, Grossman
1986). There are nonetheless signiﬁcant exceptions: With suﬃcient product
diﬀerentiation and Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly, subsidies to domestic ﬁrms
might be welfare enhancing if the negative eﬀect of subsidies on proﬁts of foreign
ﬁrms can be outweighted by positive eﬀect on foreign consumer surplus (Collie
2005).
From political economy point of view, the existence of asymmetric incentive
to lobby on part of the losers (Baldwin, Robert-Nicoud 2007) also suggests
that state aid must involve a signiﬁcant share of wasteful projects. Empirically,
there is indeed anecdotal evidence stating that state and regional aids largely fail
to take into account the comparative advantage (Midelfart-Knarvik, Overman
2002).
Yet in the European Union, state aid in the form of direct transfers, equity
participation, debt conversion, tax deferrals, or loan guarantees is strictly regu-
lated. Each individual bailout must be approved by the EC Commission and the
approval is conditional on a set of criteria gathered in the “Community Guide-
lines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring Firms in Diﬃculty” (Oﬃcial
Journal of the European Union, 2004). In light of this, it is interesting that the
proportion of negative decisions of the European Commission during the 1990s
amounted to less than 2 percent of all cases under investigation (Besley et al.
1999).
We aim to show that, in a large set of circumstances, the optimal state aid
control is indeed no control. We build on the signaling model of wasteful state
aid in Dewatripont and Seabright (2006). This is a single country model where
a politician exerts costly eﬀort, and a representative voter lacks information
on the aid beneﬁts and the politician’s eﬀort. Wasteful state aid then emerges
as a signal of eﬀort by which a high-eﬀort politician separates from a low-
eﬀort politician. The signal is however costly for the voter since the high-eﬀort
politician—who is more likely reelected—funds also wasteful projects, whereas
the low-eﬀort politicians funds only proﬁtable projects. This contrasts to a
dynamic framework in Casamatta and De Paoli (2007), where the politician
with a stronger taste for the public investment is less likely to adopt a wasteful
policy.
1This line of reasoning follows classic career concern models of pre-electoral
signaling (cf., Persson, Tabellini 2000). Pre-electoral signaling dates back to
Rogoﬀ’s (1990) political budget cycle. With lack of evidence on cycles in ﬁscal
aggregates (Brenden, Drazen 2008), recent research aims to restate the model
away from total spending towards signaling through the structure of spending
(Drazen, Eslava 2007, 2008). In the context of career concerns, another impor-
tant variable serving as a signal of the politician type is the volume of campaign
spending (Roumanias 2005).
Technically, a very close setup to ours oﬀers Gersbach (2004), where money-
burning reﬁnement (e.g., costly uninformative advertising) is applied to elim-
inate pooling equilibria. Streb (2005) extends the setup by incomplete infor-
mation on both competence and opportunism (lack of honesty), whereby extra
spending loses part of its appeal as it serves as a signal of manipulation. Incen-
tives remedying career concerns through change in the candidate quality in a
citizen-candidate framework have been furthermore analyzed in Candel-Sanchez
(2007), Poutvaara, Takalo (2007), and Gersbach (2009).
In the context of industrial policy, an alternative model of wasteful pre-
electoral public investment is a model of ‘white elephants’ in Robinson and
Torvik (2005). It shows that in order to win elections, incumbent governments
might undertake projects with a negative surplus. The reason is that only
the incumbent can credibly commit to unproﬁtable projects, which creates an
electoral advantage of extra constituency of the beneﬁciaries.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 outlines the setup. Section 3 derives
equilibria of the baseline case without aid control, including equilibria omitted
in Dewatripont and Seabright (2006). On top of that, it discusses design of
incentives aiming at the elimination of waste. Section 4 introduces the state aid
controller into the model and proves the central results of the paper. Section 5
concludes.
2 The setup
Consider a politician providing state aid. The politician observes a pool of aid
projects, investigates into their cost-beneﬁt ratios, and decides on ﬁnancing.
Suppose each project costs c > 0, but projects diﬀer in beneﬁt v ∈ {v, ¯ v}, where
v < c < ¯ v, thus a project is either wasteful or proﬁtable.
The politician has to invest eﬀort to ﬁnd a proﬁtable project. More precisely,
suppose that the politician faces a menu of lotteries over proﬁtable and wasteful
projects. A lottery with a higher likelihood of a proﬁtable project is available at
the cost of higher eﬀort than a lottery with a lower likelihood of the proﬁtable
project. Speciﬁcally, to ﬁnd a proﬁtable project with probability i ∈ [0,1], let
the eﬀort be ψ(i), where ψ(0) = 0, ψi > 0, ψii > 0, and limi→1- ψ(i) = +∞,
where the last term guarantees the existence of an interior optimum of eﬀort.
Once eﬀort is exerted, the corresponding lottery is carried out, the politician
observes true v, and ﬁnally determines whether to fund the project (a = 1) or
not (a = 0).
2The politician pays entire cost c, but internalizes only a portion of the ben-
eﬁt, αv. We assume two types of politicians with the rates of internalization
α ∈ {α, ¯ α} that are private information, where 0 < α < ¯ α < 1. We call the
high-type H-politician, and low-type L-politician. Eﬀort and true (ex post)
proﬁtability of the project are also private information of the politician.
Timing is as follows: (0) Nature chooses H-politician with apriori probability
p ∈ [0,1], and L-politician with probability 1 − p. (1) The politician chooses
lottery i, and exerts eﬀort ψ(i). (2) Nature chooses proﬁtable project with
probability i, and wasteful project with probability 1 − i. (3) Upon realization
of the lottery, the politician observes v, and determines funding, a ∈ {0,1}. (4)
A representative voter observes funding choice and reelects.
Since the voter does not observe project type, eﬀort, or politician type,
only the funding choice, there is just a pair of posterior beliefs of the voter:
p0 = Pr(α = ¯ α|a = 0), and p1 = Pr(α = ¯ α|a = 1). The pair of re-election rates
he or she selects is thus (r0,r1) ∈ [0,1] × [0,1], where r0 applies in the case of
no funding, and r1 in the case of funding.
Since the setup is ﬁnite, let the continuation value of reelection for both
politicians be ﬁxed and positive, B > 0. This gives us that the politician’s
infoset value in the case of no funding is r0B, and in the case of funding writes
αv − c + r1B. For convenience, we denote the funding function of H-politician
as ¯ a(v) and the funding function of L-politician as a(v).
Fig. 1 illustrates the game tree. Given the voter’s limited way of making
belief updates, this incomplete information game features no proper subgame,
hence any equilibrium can be characterized as a Bayesian equilibrium (possibly
with reﬁnements). Notice that, unlike in many retrospective voting models,
the voter is not able to commit to (pre-announce) a pair of reelection rates
(r0,r1). If so, the voter as a Stackelberg leader would select from a set of proper
subgames, and perfectness would have to be imposed.
3 Equilibria
3.1 Preliminaries
To understand incentives of politicians, notice that a politician has exactly two
instruments, eﬀort and funding. Absent from reelection incentives, H-politician
would use both instruments at a socially more preferred level than L-politician:
Eﬀort would be larger given the larger internalization of the beneﬁt, and fund-
ing choice would be eﬃcient (proﬁtable projects funded, and wasteful projects
stopped). With reelection, however, politicians additionally respond to a re-
election premium for funding, (r1 − r0)B; if positive, politicians have an extra
incentive to fund.
Dewatripont and Seabright (2006) identify a wasteful semi-separating equi-
librium, characterized such that (i) L-politician exerts less eﬀort than H-politician,
but (ii) H-politician funds all projects, including wasteful ones, whereas L-
politician funds only proﬁtable projects, and (iii) the voter maintains a positive
3Figure 1: Game tree (H: high-type politician, L: low-type politician, V: voter)
reelection premium that induces wasteful spending as a signaling device of the
high-type politician.
Thus, a tradeoﬀ is associated with H-politician: The politician is able to
access a better lottery, yet—facing a better lottery—overfunds. He or she keeps
unobservable instrument (eﬀort) at a socially more preferred level, but distorts
the observable instrument (funding). Distortion of an observable instrument is
accepted by the voter as long as the expected payoﬀ from distortion compensated
by better selection (as delivered by H-politician) exceeds expected payoﬀ from
non-distortion combined with worse selection (as delivered by L-politician).
The setup where beneﬁts are uncertain, with uncertainty reducible by the
politician’s eﬀort, is not only relevant to the provision of state aid. It applies
to virtually all public policies where politician’s eﬀort is necessary to avoid risk
of funding a wasteful project. Provision of state aid is only special due to
the existence of a supranational authority that corrects for external eﬀects of
national state aid. Thus, the semi-separating equilibrium lends itself to a broad
interpretation: Policy activism distinguishes competent governments, hence is a
valuable signal, but also inevitably brings overspending compared to the social
optimum.
Dewatripont and Seabright (2006) describe this equilibrium only implicitly.
4For comparative statics as well as the comprehensive analysis of the aid control,
a full and explicit description of all feasible Bayesian equilibria is a precondition.
This is subject of the following subsections.
3.2 The politicians’ best responses
From the infoset values in the funding nodes, where project type is disclosed
to the politician, it is straightforward that a politician’s decision to fund is
represented by αv − c + r1B ≥ r0B. We apply this inequality when charac-
terizing the politician’s best response. Before that, we introduce Assumption
1 by which politicians’ valuations are such that politicians do not completely
separate. The reverse case (where H-politician always internalizes more beneﬁts
than L-politician) doesn’t directly feature the key tradeoﬀ related to a high-type
as suggested by Dewatripont and Seabright (2006), hence is not analyzed in the
paper. We can provide solution to this case upon request.
Assumption 1 (Overlap) H-politician internalizes the beneﬁt of the low-value
project less than L-politician internalizes the beneﬁt of the high-value project,
α¯ v > ¯ αv.
Let ρ := r1−r0 ∈ [−1,1] be the reelection diﬀerence, expressing the diﬀerence
between reelection for a funding and non-funding politician. The value ρB is to
be called reelection premium. Table 1 uses the politician’s optimal decision to
fund to characterize ﬁve subsets of the reelection rates r0,r1 (or, equivalently,
ﬁve subintervals of the reelection diﬀerence ρ):
Table 1: Partition of the feasible reelection rates
Φ1 = {r0,r1 : ¯ α¯ v − c + ρB ≤ 0}
Φ2 = {r0,r1 : α¯ v − c + ρB < 0 ≤ ¯ α¯ v − c + (r1 − r0)B}
Φ3 = {r0,r1 : ¯ αv − c + ρB < 0 ≤ α¯ v − c + (r1 − r0)B}
Φ4 = {r0,r1 : αv − c + ρB < 0 ≤ ¯ αv − c + (r1 − r0)B}
Φ5 = {r0,r1 : 0 ≤ αv − c + ρB}
Throughout the paper, we assume that all subsets are feasible (Assumption
2). In other words, the set of reelection premia is large enough to permit any
funding choice of any politician. A necessary condition for feasibility of all
subsets is twofold: First, the condition characterizing Φ1-set holds for the lowest
reelection diﬀerence (ρ = −1), where funding is maximally punished, (r0,r1) =
(1,0). Second, the condition characterizing Φ5-set holds for the largest reelection
diﬀerence (ρ = 1), where funding is maximally rewarded, (r0,r1) = (0,1).
Assumption 2 (Feasible subsets) The game parameters (α, ¯ α,v, ¯ v,c,B) sat-
isfy ¯ α¯ v − c − B ≤ 0 ≤ αv − c + B.
Our ﬁnal restriction on parameters states that the Φ1-set entirely belongs
to the subspace of a negative reelection premium, where ρB = (r1 − r0)B < 0,
5or ρ < 0. As we will immediately see, this is equivalent to say that for a zero
reelection diﬀerence, at least H-politician funds the proﬁtable project. This
assumption is entirely for the sharpness of prediction in comparative statics.
Assumption 3 (Negative Φ1-set) Assume ¯ α¯ v − c > 0, in order to obtain
(r0,r1) ∈ Φ1 : ρ < 0.
Given the subsets in Table 1, funding choices in the best responses of the
politicians are in Table 2. Notice in this context that Dewatripont and Seabright
(2006) implicitly restricted their investigation to the Φ4-set, disregarding the
other best responses.
Table 2: The optimal funding choices of the politicians
Subset a(v) a(¯ v) ¯ a(v) ¯ a(¯ v)
Φ1 0 0 0 0
Φ2 0 0 0 1
Φ3 0 1 0 1
Φ4 0 1 1 1
Φ5 1 1 1 1
In addition to funding, the other politician’s instrument is eﬀort. The opti-
mal level of eﬀort depends on whether—facing reelection rates—it is optimal for
the politician to fund no project, only proﬁtable project, or both projects. The
optimal eﬀort is thus subset-dependent, as Table 2 shows: L-politician funds no
project on Φ1 and Φ2, single project on Φ3 and Φ4, and both projects on Φ5.
H-politician diﬀers by funding single project on Φ2, and both projects on Φ4.
Clearly, given the larger internalization rate, H-politician funds relatively more
than L-politician.
For no project funded, the optimal level of eﬀort is obviously zero. For only
a proﬁtable project to be funded, the optimal eﬀort satisﬁes for any α ∈ {α, ¯ α}:
i = argmax{i(α¯ v − c + r1B) + (1 − i)r0B − ψ(i)} = ψ
−1
i (α¯ v − c + ρB)
For both projects to be funded, the optimal eﬀort satisﬁes for any α ∈ {α, ¯ α}:
i = argmax{i(α¯ v − c + r1B) + (1 − i)(αv − c + r1B) − ψ(i)} = ψ
−1
i (α(¯ v − v))
Denote the optimal eﬀort of H-politician as¯ i(ρ), and the eﬀort of L-politician
as i(ρ), and impose ¯ I := max{¯ i} = ¯ i(1),I := max{i} = i(1). Fig. 2 illustrates
the optimal levels of eﬀort.
3.3 Multiple equilibria
The previous subsection derived best-responses of the politicians for all pairs of
reelection rates. A necessary equilibrium condition is that the voter expecting
the politicians’ best responses does not deviate from his or her reelection rates.
6Figure 2: The optimal eﬀort of the politicians
Thus, equilibria are identiﬁed simply by checking for deviations of the voter. To
do so, Table 3 shows for each subset if H-politician is preferred to L-politician
in terms of eﬀort, funding, and overall. To get the table, we use funding choices
in Table 2 and eﬀorts in Fig. 2. It also shows whether a belief update over
politician types is feasible. Based on the overall preference and possibility of
update, we can conjecture whether the voter deviates in terms of changing his
or her reelection rates.
Table 3: When does the voter deviate?
Subset Eﬀort Funding Overall Update Deviation
Φ1 H, L H, L H, L no no
Φ2 H H H p1 > p > p0 yes
Φ3 H H,L H p1 > p > p0 yes
Φ4 H L ambiguous p1 > p > p0 ambiguous
Φ5 H H,L H no no
An important part of analysis in Table 3 is to check the voter’s posteriori
beliefs. Obviously, in Φ1 and Φ5-set, updates based on equilibrium choices
are impossible, since observable choices of both types are identical (for out-
of-equilibrium posteriors, see Proposition 1 below). For Φ2, Φ3, and Φ4-set,
H-politician exerts strictly higher eﬀort, ¯ i(ρ) > i(ρ) (see Fig. 2) and/or strictly
higher funding choice. This yields that the overall probability of funding by
H-politician is strictly higher, hence funding is a signal that reveals more likely
to encounter H-politician, and the absence of funding reveals more likely to
encounter L-politician, p0 < p < p1.
To understand the voter’s best responses, recall that from the perspective of
the voter, to re-elect is to choose a lottery of politicians with posterior (p0,1−p0)
if funding is not observed, respectively (p1,1 − p1) if funding is observed. In
contrast, not to reelect means to select a lottery of politicians with the prior
distribution (p,1 − p). Hence, if the belief update along equilibrium path leads
to an improvement in information (p0 6= p 6= p1), the voter strictly prefers
either prior or posterior lottery, unless he or she is exactly indiﬀerent between
the politicians. In other words, the voter is indiﬀerent between the lotteries if
and only if (i) the belief update is not informative, or (ii) he or she is indiﬀerent
between the politicians.
7Ambiguity of the voter’s preference over types in Φ4-set deserves a closer
look. For the voter, denote the expected value of having H-politician in this set
as
¯ u(ρ) :=¯ i(ρ)(¯ v − c) + (1 −¯ i(ρ))(v − c) = ¯ I(¯ v − c) + (1 − ¯ I)(v − c),
and the expected value of having L-politician as
u(ρ) := i(ρ)(¯ v − c) > 0.
Notice that ¯ u(ρ) is constant in ρ, whereas u(ρ) grows in ρ, because L-politician
is incentivized by larger reelection premium, di(ρ)/dρ > 0. To sum up, the
relative attractiveness of H-politician, ¯ u(ρ) − u(ρ), falls in ρ.
Due to monotonicity of the relative attractiveness of H-politician, we have a
unique cutoﬀ value of the reelection diﬀerence, where the voter anticipating Φ4-
funding is exactly indiﬀerent between the politicians. The cutoﬀ value ˆ ρ satisﬁes
¯ u(ˆ ρ) = u(ˆ ρ). From indiﬀerence in the cutoﬀ value, it is useful to express
¯ I − i(ˆ ρ)
1 − ¯ I
=
c − v
¯ v − c
.
Proposition 1 (Bayesian equilibria) If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then there
exist two sets of pooling equilibria:
1. No funding: (r0,r1) ∈ Φ1,a(v) = ¯ a(v) = 0,v ∈ {v, ¯ v},i(ρ) = i(ρ) =
0,p1 ∈ [0,1]
2. Total overfunding with a(v) = ¯ a(v) = 1,v ∈ {v, ¯ v},i(ρ) = I,i(ρ) = I,
where (i) (0,r1) ∈ Φ5,p0 < p, (ii) (r0,r1) ∈ Φ5,p0 = p, and (iii) (1,r1) ∈
Φ5,p0 > p.
If an entire Φ4-set is feasible, then there exists a set of semi-separating equi-
libria with a(v) = 0,a(¯ v) = 1,¯ a(v) = ¯ a(¯ v) = 1 if and only if (r0,r0 + ˆ ρ) ∈ Φ4.
Proof First of all, feasibility of all sets deﬁned by Assumption 2 implies that
equilibrium is not in Φ2 or Φ3-set. From Table 3, we know that in both of these
sets, the voter strictly prefers a high-type politician, and both belief updates
are informative (p0 < p < p1), hence the best response of the voter writes
(r0,r1) = (0,1), but this pair of actions belongs to the Φ5-set. Note that in the
Φ3-set, albeit funding choices are identical, updates are still informative, because
H-politician plays a better lottery, ¯ i(ρ) > i(ρ), hence funds more frequently.s
• Existence of pooling equilibrium in the Φ1-set: The posterior for a = 0
is p0 = p. The voter is indiﬀerent between the high-type and low-type
politician because both deliver the identical eﬀort, i = ¯ i = 0, as well as
identical funding, a(v) = ¯ a(v) = 0,v ∈ {v, ¯ v}. As a result, observing
a = 0, the voter is indiﬀerent between reelection (i.e., a lottery with the
high-type occurring with posterior p) and no reelection (i.e., a new draw
with the high-type occurring with prior p), and r0 is restricted only by
belonging to the Φ1-set.
8Out-of-equilibrium belief p1 in this pooling equilibrium is not restricted,
p1 ∈ [0,1], because the voter observing out-of-equilibrium action a = 1 is
still indiﬀerent over types, hence an informative posterior p1 doesn’t lead
to a change in his or her reelection rate r1.
• Existence of pooling equilibrium in the Φ5-set: The posterior for a = 1
played along the equilibrium path is not informative (p1 = p), hence the
voter setting r1 is indiﬀerent between reelection (current lottery) and new
election (new lottery). Thus, r1 restricted only by belonging to the Φ5-set.
In contrast to the Φ1-equilibrium, however, the voter strictly prefers the
high-type, hence an informative out-of-equilibrium belief p0 6= p leads to
a strict preference, r0 = 0 or r0 = 1. Speciﬁcally, if p0 < p, we have to
have r0 = 0; if p0 > p, there must be r0 = 1, and only for p = p0 is r0
restricted only by belonging to the Φ5-set.
• Suﬃcient and necessary condition for semi-separating equilibria if an entire
Φ4-set is feasible: A semi-separating equilibrium is characterized by (i)
Φ4-set and (ii) the cutoﬀ value of the reelection diﬀerence. As to (i),
Table 2 shows that the Φ4-set is a necessary condition for the politicians’
semi-separating best responses. As to (ii): If ρ 6= ˆ ρ, the voter deviates to
ρ = −1 or ρ = 1, but due to feasibility of a full Φ4-set, none of this is in the
Φ4-set. Thus, if Φ4-set is feasible, a suﬃcient and necessary condition for
the existence of an interior semi-separating wasteful spending equilibrium
is that the cutoﬀ value of a reelection diﬀerence falls exactly in the Φ4-set.
￿
Fig. 3 depicts the equilibria in the space of re-election rates (r0,r1), with
arrows indicating the direction of the deviation of the voter. Shaded areas in
Φ1 and Φ5 indicate indiﬀerence. Notice that some of the pooling equilibria
might be eliminated by standard reﬁnements. Applying passive conjectures
(out-of-equilibrium posteriors set equal to priors), we eliminate subsets (i) and
(iii) of the Φ5-pooling equilibria. Exactly the same outcome brings a test for
complete robustness (responses are best given all out-of-equilibrium beliefs):
Φ1-equilibria are completely robust, whereas Φ5-equilibria are robust only if
p0 = p. Equilibrium dominance known as the intuitive criterion (Cho, Kreps
1987) is not very helpful, because all pooling equilibria satisfy the criterion.
This is a property of feasibility of all sets in Assumption 2: It implies that for
both politicians, both funding choices a = 0 and a = 1 may appear in their
best responses. Hence, when setting out-of-equilibrium beliefs, the voter cannot
rule out any type of the politician on the basis of payoﬀ dominance over an
out-of-equilibrium action.
Finally, by Assumption 3, we know that Φ1-pooling equilibria exist if and
only if politicians expect an extra reward from the absence of funding, r0B >
r1B. This may be used as a further reﬁnement on the Φ1-pooling equilibria:
Since a voter gets nothing in the Φ1-equilibrium, it is very unlikely that he or
she tends to coordinate on a perverse incentive of strictly rewarding the absence
of funding, r0 > r1.
9Figure 3: Bayesian equilibria and the voter’s deviations
3.4 Comparative statics
In the model, one of the key question is whether accountability remedies wasteful
spending or not. Dewatripont and Seabright (2006) argue that improvements in
accountability do not address overfunding, rather exacerbate the career concerns
of the politicians. This is a strong statement given the evidence on the high
levels of public investments in countries with less competitive elections, hence
lower accountability (Keefer, Knack 2007).
In formalizing this intuition, it is useful to examine two measures shaping
incentives of the politicians, both arguably available to the voter—a change
in the project cost c the politician pays (i.e., compensating or punishing the
politician for funding), and an increase in the value of reelection B. Given the
large population size, we may consider both changes costless for a representative
voter, and focus only on the beneﬁts involved.
To start with, recall Table 1 where the ﬁve Φ-sets are deﬁned by four bound-
aries, satisfying ρ := r1 −r0 = (c−αv)/B,v ∈ {v, ¯ v},α ∈ {α, ¯ α}. This helps us
to identify the location of the equilibria sets, Φ1, Φ4, and Φ5.
By Assumption 1 and the starting assumptions of project and politician
types, we have ¯ α¯ v > α¯ v > ¯ αv > αv. Inserting into the deﬁnition of the wasteful
project, v < c, we immediately get 0 < c − v < c − ¯ αv < c − αv. As a result,
both the Φ5-set and Φ4-set are subsets of the subspace of a positive reelection
premium, ρB > 0 (the north-west triangle on Fig. 3). From Assumption 3, we
also know that the Φ1-set implies a negative reelection premium (the south-east
10triangle on Fig. 3).
Recalling once again that the boundaries are deﬁned by ρ = r1 − r0 =
(c − αv)/B, and identifying that Φ4 ∪ Φ5 lies above the zero-premium line
ρ = 0, whereas Φ1 lies below the line, it is now straightforward to analyze the
eﬀects of parametric changes in c and B:
1. An increase in the project cost the politician pays shifts boundaries up-
wards, to the higher levels of reelection diﬀerence. With a larger cost, a
reelection diﬀerence (and reelection premium) must grow to induce switch
to a more pro-funding choice. A consequence is that the Φ5-set of over-
funding pooling equilibria shrinks, and the Φ1-set of no-funding pooling
equilibria enlarges.
2. An increase in the reelection value decreases the absolute values of the
boundaries. A larger value of the reelection thus makes politicians’ fund-
ing more sensitive to the absolute value of the reelection diﬀerence. The
boundaries move towards the zero-premium line, ρ = 0, hence both sets
of pooling equilibria, Φ1-set and Φ5-set, get larger.
Our main interest rests with the semi-separating equilibria. Proposition 2
delivers two important comparative statics results regarding these equilibria.
First, minor changes in the boundaries that keep the cutoﬀ value ˆ ρ within the
Φ4-set are irrelevant, as they do not change the voter’s utility. Although minor
changes in parameters c or B change the equilibrium cutoﬀ value ˆ ρ, this is fully
oﬀset by change in eﬀorts. Second, by manipulating boundaries such that the
Φ4-set is infeasible (hence Assumption 2 no longer holds), it is possible to get rid
of the wasteful spending for good. The intuitive argument by Dewatripont and
Seabright (2006) on uselessness of accountability is thus perfectly valid unless
the voter can use relatively harsh punishments for funding in terms of extra
project cost, and/or reduction the value of reelection.
Proposition 2 (Neutrality and cornering-out) 1. Any change in project
cost c paid by the politician or reelection rent B received by the reelected
politician that preserves the existence of semi-separating equilibria, ∃(r0,r0+
ˆ ρ) ∈ Φ4, does not change eﬀorts (i(ˆ ρ),I) or funding choices of the politi-
cians, hence the voter’s utility remains unchanged in the semi-separating
equilibrium.
2. By imposing a suﬃciently high project cost c or suﬃciently low reelec-
tion rent B, the Φ4 and Φ5-sets become infeasible, hence all Φ4 and
Φ5-equilibria disappear. As a corollary, there exist pairs (c,B) that in-
duce a corner Φ3-equilibrium with eﬃcient funding choice of both types,
a(v) = ¯ a(v) = 0,a(¯ v) = ¯ a(¯ v) = 1.
Proof Part 1 (Neutrality): Funding choices are constant since a suﬃcient and
necessary condition for a set of semi-separating equilibria is preserved. Next,
Proposition 1 proves that each semi-separating equilibrium is characterized by
11a reelection diﬀerence equal to the cutoﬀ value, ˆ ρ, where the voter is indiﬀerent
over types, u(ˆ ρ)−¯ u(ˆ ρ) = ¯ I(¯ v−v)+v−c−i(ˆ ρ)(¯ v−c) = 0. Since ¯ I = ψ
−1
i (¯ α(¯ v−v))
is constant in ρ, and the cost c in the argument of the voter’s utilities are
constant (voter’s, not politicians’) costs, we have to have that also i(ˆ ρ) must
remain unchanged, even if ˆ ρ changed. With all arguments constant, also u(ˆ ρ)
and ¯ u(ˆ ρ) are constant, and the expected voter’s utility is constant (equal zero).
Part 2 (Cornering-out): From Table 1, both Φ4 and Φ5-sets are infeasible
if Φ4-set is not feasible for the maximal ρ = 1, i.e. if ¯ αv − c + B < 0. In such
a case, the reelection rates (r0,r1) = (0,1) that are equivalent to the maximal
reelection diﬀerence ρ = 1 belong into the Φ3-set, where funding choices of the
politicians are eﬃcient. In the Φ3-set, as known from proof to Proposition 1
and Table 3, the voter strictly prefers (r0,r1) = (0,1), hence doesn’t deviate
and this pair of reelection rates is an equilibrium. ￿
Another interesting property of boundary manipulations is an equilibrium
switch. Consider a decrease in c or increase in B that enlarges Φ5-set such
that the pre-change reelection rates characterized by the initial ˆ ρ become now
elements of the enlarged Φ5-set. Then, if voters are less ﬂexible in changing
the actions than politicians (e.g., there might be a coordination problem in
the group of representative voters), and do not adapt their reelection rates,
these become equilibrium rates, but now of a pooling equilibrium, not a semi-
separating equilibrium. Although semi-separating equilibria with a new (lower)
cutoﬀ values will be feasible, they need not to be played.
To summarize the entire section on Bayesian equilibria of the baseline game:
(i) Multiple equilibria exist. (ii) Wasteful spending preserves only in a weak
equilibrium, where the voter is indiﬀerent over types, hence H-politician doesn’t
gain any electoral advantage. (iii) Minor incentives do not change the politicians’
strategies: As long as the wasteful signaling equilibrium exists, the levels of
politicians’ eﬀorts cannot be changed. (iv) The only way to remedy wasteful
spending is to impose suﬃciently large incentives that completely eliminate
wasteful signaling in the range of best responses of the politicians.
4 Wasteful aid control
4.1 Benevolent controller
In this section, we restrict ourselves to the state aid control imposed on the
interior semi-separating Φ4-equilibrium. Although it might be interesting to
look on the aid control as a device to resolve multiplicity of equilibria or eliminate
total overfunding in Φ5-pooling equilibrium, our main goal is to show that state
aid control is often impossible as a remedy to wasteful signalling, and if possible,
it is not desirable given the adverse eﬀects on politician’ eﬀort.
Setting an objective of the controller is of course critical to modeling aid
control. We restrict ourselves to a benevolent state aid controller, who maxi-
mizes utility of the representative voter. This limits the analysis to essentially
12a normative, second-best problem. Motivation is twofold: (i) If the optimal aid
control under a benevolent controller is no control, then—except for a dynamic
inconsistency problem—a constrained or biased policy-maker should not be able
to deliver a better outcome. Therefore, optimality of no-control should be ro-
bust to more realistic objectives. (ii) To reveal the project type or politician
type, information must be sought at a cost. In a group of representative voters,
this costly information is thus a public good. Hence, it is interesting to see what
happens if the representative voter can instal a citizen-candidate, sharing policy
preferences of the representative voter, and optimally providing this public good
through tax revenues.
The state-aid control is meaningful only if a project is funded, i.e. for nodes
where a = 1. To solve for equilibria in these nodes, we use that in a Φ4-
equilibrium, it is common knowledge that H-politician funds all projects and
L-politicians funds only i(ˆ ρ) < 1 projects. This allows the controller to use
equivalently a posterior probability of having H-politician, π, or a posterior
probability of having a proﬁtable project, q(π). Updating posteriors on the
politician type is thus instrumental only to updating posteriors on the project
type; if H-politician is more likely, then a proﬁtable project is less likely:
q(π) := π¯ I + 1 − π,
dq(π)
dπ
= ¯ I − 1 < 0.
We introduce a benevolent aid controller as follows: If funding takes place,
an extra Stage 5 with the controller’s node follows. The controller starts with
a posterior belief on the project quality q(p1), and decides only on investing
into a single costly signal. The signal is either direct (on the project quality,
Sv ∈ {v,v}), or indirect (on the politician quality, Sα ∈ {α, ¯ α}). Once a signal
is observed, the controller updates his or her belief on the proﬁtable project
type to either q or q. (For convenience, we keep this notation irrespective of the
signal type; it will be clear in the context which signal type is being examined.)
Lastly, the controller approves funding of the project with probability f ∈ [0,1].
Theoretically, we could allow the controller lead the game and make an
investigation with an observable commitment to the approval rate f prior the
reelection stage. This would nevertheless complicate the analysis, because the
reelection rates would have to reﬂect the observed actions of the controller.
The voter would not only use the approval rate as a signal, but possibly would
also infer realization of the signal, since the voter and the controller share the
objectives, and their information sharing should be trivial. In this extension
of the strategy set of the voter, the controller’s action would become a direct
tool of domestic politics. At this moment, however, we are not interested in
the interplay between domestic accountability and the control of an external
authority, albeit it creates a direct avenue for further research.
The approval rate f depends only on whether it is better to accept a lottery
over payoﬀs (¯ v − c,v − c) with probabilities (q,1 − q) or remain in the status
quo with certain zero payoﬀ. In other words, the controller is minimizing the
expected loss of the Type I and Type II errors (approve a wasteful project, ban
a proﬁtable project). Given that the expected payoﬀ is linear in q, this clearly
13yields a step-wise correspondence f(q), where f(q) = 1 if q > q∗, f(q) ∈ [0,1]
if q = q∗, and f(q) = 0 if q < q∗. The threshold level of the belief q∗ satisﬁes
0 < q∗ < 1, because
q∗ :=
c − v
¯ v − v
.
Next, it is convenient to deﬁne a worthless signal. A signal σ is called
worthless if f(q(p1)) = f(q) = f(¯ q). Such a signal has no value since any
realization of the signal leads to only small changes in beliefs that keep the
initial approval rate f(q(p1)) unchanged, irrespective of the realization of the
signal. A worthless signal will not be purchased by the controller.
A ﬁnal interesting point is that for the Φ4-equilibrium without aid control,
it is ex ante socially optimal to approve the funded project, f(q(p1)) = 1. Using










1 − ¯ I
>
¯ I − i(ˆ ρ)
1 − ¯ I
=
c − v




As a result, q(p1) > q∗, from which f(q(p1)) = 1 clearly follows. In other
words, a controller without a signal, like a voter, is willing to approve any funded
project. Thus, the introduction of a controller aﬀects wasteful spending if and
only if the controller is able to get extra information, and the signal is strong
enough not to be worthless.
4.2 Indirect signals
Suppose a signal about the politician’s type Sα ∈ {α, ¯ α}, true with probability
σ ∈ [1/2,1], and false with probability 1 − σ,
σ := Pr(Sα = α|α = α) = Pr(Sα = ¯ α|α = ¯ α).
For the purpose of Proposition 3, we introduce the controller’s updated be-
liefs over H-politician, ¯ p and p:
¯ p := Pr(α = ¯ α|a = 1,Sα = ¯ α) =
p1σ
p1σ + (1 − p1)(1 − σ)
≥ p1
p := Pr(α = ¯ α|a = 1,Sα = α) =
p1(1 − σ)
p1(1 − σ) + (1 − p1)σ
≤ p1
Applying the q(π) function, we may write ¯ q = q(¯ p) and q = q(p).
Proposition 3 (No indirect control) Indirect signal Sα is worthless for all
σ ∈ [1/2,1]. The controller never purchases such signals and approves all funded
projects with probability f(q(p1)) = 1.
14Proof We aim to show that q ≥ q(p1) ≥ ¯ q > q∗. Observing Sα = α implies
p ≤ p1, hence q ≥ q(p1). This leads to f(q) = 1, because ˜ q > q∗. Observing
Sα = ¯ α implies ¯ p ≥ p1, and ¯ q ≤ q(p1). Hence, there is a chance that ¯ q falls
below the critical level q∗. Since dq(π)/dπ < 0, it is suﬃcient to examine only
the extreme of ¯ p = 1, which corresponds to the extreme (truth-revealing) signal
σ = 1. Imposing into q(π), we have ¯ q = q(1) = ¯ I.
Consider now the property of the cutoﬀ value ˆ ρ that characterizes the Φ4-
equilibrium. Here, the expected payoﬀ from having H-politician is equal to that
of L-politician, and both are positive:
¯ I(¯ v − c) + (1 − ¯ I)(v − c) = i(ˆ ρ)(¯ v − c) > 0
We use positivity of the left-hand side to rewrite
¯ q = ¯ I >
c − v
¯ v − v
= q∗.
With ¯ q > q(p1), the situation is simple since f(¯ q) = 1. To sum up, f(q(p1)) =
f(q) = f(¯ q) = 1. The signal is indeed worthless and is never purchased. ￿
4.3 Direct signals
Alternatively, assume that the controller can purchase a symmetric signal Sv ∈
{v, ¯ v}, true with probability σ, and false with probability 1 − σ,
σ := Pr(Sv = v|v = v) = Pr(Sv = ¯ v|v = ¯ v).
The updates on the proﬁtable project type are now redeﬁned as follows:
¯ q := Pr(v = ¯ v|a = 1,Sv = ¯ v) =
q(p1)σ
q(p1)σ + (1 − q(p1))(1 − σ)
≥ q(p1)
q := Pr(v = ¯ v|a = 1,Sv = v) =
q(p1)(1 − σ)
q(p1)(1 − σ) + (1 − q(p1))σ
≤ q(p1)
Now, the key diﬀerence to the case of indirect signal is that the range of
posteriors q and ¯ q for diﬀerent strength of the signal σ is not [¯ I,1], but includes
an entire unit interval [0,1]. This becomes evident once we calculate the real-
izations of a perfect signal, σ = 1: (q, ¯ q) = (0,1). For optimistic realizations
of the signals (those increasing q), ranges of both types of signal are identical,
[q(p1),1], and signaling works identically. A signal of one type can always be
replaced by a feasible signal of the other type. For pessimistic realization of the




over the project type are thus more informative than signals over the politician
type. Unlike a signal on the politician type, a signal over the project type is not
always worthless, i.e. may revert the approval rate f(q(p1)) = 1 to f(q) = 0.
Fig. 4 illustrates.
Notice that a signal is worthless as long as q ≥ q∗, or σ ≤ σ∗, where
σ∗ :=
q(p1)(¯ v − c)
q(p1)(¯ v − c) + (1 − q(p1))(c − v)
.
15Figure 4: The updates ¯ q and q for direct and indirect signals of various precision
The threshold level of σ∗ allows for an interesting interpretation. The de-
nominator comprises a sum of all net beneﬁts related to a correct choice. It is
a weighted sum of the net beneﬁt of a correct approval and the net beneﬁt of
a correct ban, where the weights are pre-signal beliefs on the project type, i.e.
q(p1). The nominator is just the ﬁrst type of net beneﬁts, related to the correct
approval. The critical ratio is thus the pre-signal relative importance of approval.
Clearly, if q(p1) is large, and the controller is optimistic prior obtaining a signal,
the signal must be very strong to temper optimism. With optimism, only very
precise signals are purchased.
4.4 The game with aid control
The no-control Φ4-equilibrium is control-proof as long as the signal is worthless
for q(p1). Thus, it remains to analyze cases with suﬃciently strong signals,
σ > σ∗. We proceed by backward induction, considering the controller’s choice.
A signal that is not worthless yields f(q) = 0 < 1 = f(¯ q). Up the game tree,
this is anticipated by the politicians. We introduce the anticipated approval
rates for each value of the project:
Pr(f = 1|v = v) = Pr(Sv = ¯ v|v = v) = 1 − σ
Pr(f = 1|v = ¯ v) = Pr(Sv = ¯ v|v = ¯ v) = σ
Since each politician observes the project type, he or she anticipates type-
dependent approval rates σ and 1−σ. Funding choices of the politicians rewrite
into
(1 − σ)(αv − c) + r1B ≥ r0B,
σ(α¯ v − c) + r1B ≥ r0B,
16where α ∈ {α, ¯ α}. Since σ ≤ 1 and 1 − σ < 1, the boundaries between Φ1
to Φ5-sets now shrink towards the zero premium line, ρ = 0. Interestingly, a
drop in the approval rate has a similar eﬀect on the individual boundaries as an
increase in the reelection rent B.
It is necessary to analyze whether the boundaries preserve their ordering
so that the structure of the optimal funding choices as in Table 2 remains
unchanged. This is a relevant concern given that the approval rates diﬀer,
1 − σ < σ, which stems from σ > σ∗ > 1/2. We require
(1 − σ)(c − αv) > (1 − σ)(c − ¯ αv) > σ(c − α¯ v) > σ(c − ¯ α¯ v).
The left and right inequalities hold by standard assumptions, so the only
issue is if (1 − σ)(c − ¯ αv) > σ(c − α¯ v). By Assumption 3, we have ¯ αv − c <
v−c < 0 < α¯ v−c, which secures that the middle inequality holds for any signal.
In a semi-separating equilibrium with aid control, eﬀort levels will diﬀer from
the equilibrium without control. For H-politician, denote the new optimal value
I(σ), to be compared with ¯ I of the case without aid control:
I(σ) := argmax{iσ(¯ α¯ v − c) + (1 − i)(1 − σ)(¯ αv − c) + Br1 − ψ(i)}
= ψ
−1
i {¯ α[σ¯ v − (1 − σ)v] − (2σ − 1)c}
To see that I(σ) < ¯ I, notice the argument of a monotonic increasing function
ψ
−1











i {¯ α(¯ v − v)} = ¯ I
I(1) = ψ
−1
i {¯ α¯ v − c} < ψ
−1
i {¯ α(¯ v − v)} = ¯ I
For L-politician, denote the optimal level i(σ), to be possibly compared to
i(ˆ ρ) of the no-control regime:
i(σ) := argmax{iσ(α¯ v) + ir1B + (1 − i)r0B − ψ(i)}
= ψ
−1
i {σ(α¯ v − c) + (r1 − r0)B}
At last, we can proceed to the welfare evaluation of the state aid control.
Recall that in any Φ4-equilibrium, expected payoﬀs from both politician types
are equal, hence we may write the voter’s expected payoﬀ in two equivalent
ways:
¯ w(σ) := σI(σ)(¯ v − c) + (1 − I(σ))(1 − σ)(v − c)
w(σ) := σi(σ)(¯ v − c)
These compare with the voter’s expected payoﬀ under the case of no control:
¯ u(ˆ ρ) = ¯ I(¯ v − c) + (1 − ¯ I)(v − c)
u(ˆ ρ) = i(ˆ ρ)(¯ v − c)
17The voter’s indiﬀerence in Φ4-equilibrium implies w(σ) = ¯ w(σ), and u(ˆ ρ) =
¯ u(ˆ ρ). From comparison of ¯ w(σ) with ¯ u(ˆ ρ), it can be seen that aid control
combines three eﬀects, one positive and two negative. The ﬁrst beneﬁcial eﬀect
is diligence, since only 1 − σ wasteful projects are funded. The other side of
the coin is overcautiousness, since some proﬁtable projects (again share 1 − σ)
are not approved for funding. The third eﬀort is lower eﬀort of H-politician,
I(σ) < ¯ I, hence the pool of projects proposed by H-politician deteriorates.
The tradeoﬀ may lead to welfare superiority of no-control regime as well as
superiority of the aid control regime. The following two examples illustrate two
extreme cases: In Example 1, no-control regime dominates any control regime.
In Example 2, both extreme control regimes—one with a useless signal (σ = 1/2)
and one with a perfect signal (σ = 1)—dominate the no-control regime.
Example 1. Assume v = 0 < 1 = c < 5 = ¯ v. Let ψ(i) = −i−log(1−i), where
for i ∈ (0,1), ψi = i/(1−i) > 0,ψii = (1−i)−2 > 0, and the inverse marginal cost
function is increasing and within the unit interval, ψ
−1
i (x) = x/(x + 1) ∈ [0,1].
Let ¯ α = 1/2, so that I(1) > I(1
2). This implies that argmaxσ ¯ w(σ) = 1. The
eﬀorts are ¯ I = 5/7 > 3/5 = I(1). The expected payoﬀs are ¯ u(ˆ ρ) = 90/35 >
84/35 = ¯ w(1).
Example 2. Assume v = 0 < 4 = c < 5 = ¯ v. The cost function again satisﬁes
ψ
−1
i (x) = x/(x + 1). Let ¯ α = 9/10. The eﬀorts are ¯ I = 9/11 > I(1
2) = 9/13 >
I(1) = 1/3. The expected payoﬀs are ¯ w(1/2) = 9/13 > ¯ w(1) = 1/3 > ¯ u(ˆ ρ) =
1/11.
We identify a suﬃcient condition for the no-control regime to dominate
any control regime. This will be useful for the ensuing discussion on the
(non)desirability of state aid control.
Proposition 4 (No direct control) Suppose that Φ4-equilibria with wasteful
spending as signaling exist in regimes with and without aid control. In these
equilibria, the regime of no state aid control involves a larger expected payoﬀ of
the voter than any regime with state aid control, ¯ u(ˆ ρ) > max ¯ w(σ),σ ∈ [1/2,1],
if
α¯ v − ¯ αv > max{¯ α¯ v − c; ¯ α
2(¯ v − v)}.
Proof First, we bind ¯ w(σ) from above. The eﬀort ˜ I := maxσ∈[1/2,1] I(σ) =
ψ
−1
i {max[¯ α¯ v−c; ¯ α
2(¯ v−v)]} is the maximal eﬀort of H-politician under the case
with control. For the voter, the best lottery (given constant eﬀort) in the case
with control is σ = 1, hence we can set upper bound on the expected payoﬀ
¯ w(σ) as ˜ I(¯ v − c) ≥ ¯ w(σ).
Second, a suﬃcient condition for the strict dominance of no-control is to
ensure ¯ u(ˆ ρ) = u(ˆ ρ) = i(ˆ ρ)(¯ v − c) > ˜ I(¯ v − c) ≥ ¯ w(σ). This is equivalent to
i(ˆ ρ) > ˜ I, or
α¯ v − c + ˆ ρB > max{¯ α¯ v − c; ¯ α
2(¯ v − v)}.
18Using (r0,r1) ∈ Φ4, we establish that for the case of no control c−¯ αv ≤ B(ˆ ρ).
This creates a lower bound on i(ˆ ρ), which can now be compared with ˜ I,
α¯ v − c + ˆ ρB ≥ α¯ v − ¯ αv > max{¯ α¯ v − c; ¯ α
2(¯ v − v).
Thus, a condition α¯ v − ¯ αv > max{¯ α¯ v − c; ¯ α
2(¯ v − v) is suﬃcient to imply
i ≥ Imax, and ¯ u(ˆ ρ) ≥ ¯ w(σ). ￿
As the ﬁnal step, we use the suﬃcient condition for explicit comparative
statics of the optimality of no control. The condition rewrites into two subcon-
ditions,
α¯ v − ¯ αv − ¯ α¯ v + c ≥ 0,
2α¯ v − ¯ αv − ¯ α¯ v ≥ 0.
It is easy to deduce that the two conditions are more likely satisﬁed, the
higher is c, the lower is v, the higher is α, and the lower is ¯ α. To interpret:
Aid control is not desirable when (i) the project cost is large, (ii) losses of the
unproﬁtable project go up, and (iii) the politicians are relatively homogenous.
5 Conclusion
We have analyzed a signaling game where competent politicians strategically
use state aid to manifest competence. We focused entirely on interior equilib-
ria. In the regime of no state aid control, as introduced by Dewatripont and
Seabright (2006), we conjecture the following: (i) Multiple equilibria exist. In
overfunding pooling equilibria, politicians fund all projects, hence spending can-
not signal competence. In zero-funding pooling equilibria, nothing is funded,
hence a loss entails underfunding rather than wasteful funding. (ii) Wasteful
spending preserves in a weak equilibrium, where the voter is indiﬀerent over
types, hence electoral advantage of the high-type politician is completely wiped
out. (iii) Marginal incentives do not change the politicians’ strategies: As long
as the wasteful signaling equilibrium still exists, the politicians’ levels of eﬀort
are unchanged. (iv) The only way to remedy wasteful spending is to impose
suﬃciently large incentives that completely eliminate wasteful signaling. This
also eliminates overfunding pooling equilibria and introduces eﬃcient funding
choices of all politicians. If that is achieved by means of a lower reelection rent,
then in contrast to compensating the project cost, it is also possible to eliminate
underfunding equilibria and install a unique equilibrium. Hence, a change in
the reelection rent is a better tool than a compensation of the project cost. In
other words, the disciplinary incentives should be future-oriented.
In the regime with aid control, our results are as follows: (i) The benevolent
controller who resorts to extra information on the politician’s type (indirect
signal) will approve all projects as if having no signal, hence the signal turns
to be useless. (ii) Information on the project type (direct signal) may be also
useless, if the signal is not strong enough. (iii) With signals that are strong
19enough, eﬀort levels—given constant reelection premium—decrease. As a result,
the existence of aid control brings a tradeoﬀ combining three eﬀects: diligence,
overcautiousness, and deterioration of the pool of funded projects. (iv) We
identify a suﬃcient condition for the optimal state aid control to be no control,
regardless of the precision of the signal. The absence of state aid control is
socially desirable when the project cost is large, losses of the unproﬁtable project
are high, and the politicians are relatively symmetric.
To sum up, in this setup the case for pro-active state aid control of a benev-
olent supranational authority is limited. Marginal changes in politicians’ incen-
tives do not work either. Only a major reform in terms of much larger inter-
nalization of the project cost, or much lower reelection rent, is an unambiguous
way to discipline wasteful spending as pre-electoral signalling.
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